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I. PROFESSOR SIEGAN’S SCHOLARSHIP ON THE PRIVILEGES OR
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
I never met Bernard Siegan, but as I write this essay I am keenly aware
that I owe him a significant scholarly debt. Today in the American legal
academy, defenders of traditional property rights are a fairly small
minority.1 We are probably not numerous enough to be influential. But
there are enough of us that we can learn from one another, and enjoy the
friendly pleasures that come from cooperating in pursuit of commonly
shared ideals. Professor Siegan had far fewer friendly colleagues when
he wrote most of his important works. He forged ahead anyway. In
doing so, he helped clear the intellectual terrain in property and land use
that my cohort now takes for granted.
I say all this uncertain of how Professor Siegan’s scholarship will be
received in another generation. Although Siegan wrote widely on property
and land use, he is best remembered for his writings on the topics that
guide this Symposium—the relation between property, economic liberty,
and the United States Constitution.2 Those writings are caught in the
same bind as Richard Epstein’s writings on the same topics today. Most
non-originalists reject Siegan’s and Epstein’s theories of property and
government on the merits. So if either’s constitutional work is going to
be taken seriously in another generation, it will need to be among
constitutional scholars who sympathize with traditional property rights.
But many constitutional scholars who fit that description are skeptical of
constitutional property rights.3 As the proceedings of this memorial
conference illustrate, many originalist scholars are skeptical that the
Constitution protects in a meaningful way property rights or unenumerated
economic fundamental rights.4

1. See Eric R. Claeys, Takings: An Appreciative Retrospective, 15 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 439, 443–44 (2006) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)).
2. See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1980) [hereinafter SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES]; BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE
WITHOUT ZONING (1972).
3. See Claeys, supra note 1, at 439–41 (diagnosing different sources of academic
resistance to Richard Epstein’s views regarding constitutional property rights).
4. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Constitution of Economic Liberty, 45 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 709 (2008); William Michael Treanor, Take-ings, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633
(2008).
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In this essay, I hope to contribute to Professor Siegan’s legacy by
suggesting some new reasons why originalists ought to take more
seriously fundamental rights readings of the Constitution. This essay
focuses on a single provision of the Constitution: the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, which reads, “No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.”5 This Clause more than
any other symbolizes the divisions between originalists about the status
of unenumerated fundamental rights. In Saenz v. Roe,6 Justice Thomas
wrote a separate opinion to signal that he read the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect certain general natural
rights relating to citizenship.7 I will refer to Thomas’s general approach
as the “fundamental rights” species of originalism. Professor Siegan
propounded a fundamental rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause,8 and Randy Barnett9 and Richard Epstein have endorsed this
interpretation more recently.10
The main alternative to the fundamental rights approach is a formalist
approach. According to this approach, most, if not all, of the provisions
of the Constitution implement determinate, rule-like provisions, which
need not be fleshed out with reference to general moral principles of
natural rights or anything else. Although Justice Scalia did not write his
own opinion in Saenz, he did not join Justice Thomas’s opinion.11 It is
reasonable to suspect that Scalia refrained from joining Thomas’s opinion
because he harbors formalist doubts about a fundamental rights interpretation
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.12 In originalist scholarship, there
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
7. See id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8. See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT’S CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY
INTO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIETY 64–71 (1987).
9. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 194–203 (2004).
10. Richard A. Epstein, Further Thoughts on the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1096, 1098–99 (2005); Richard
A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334, 340–51 (2005) [hereinafter
Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons].
11. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 491, 521.
12. See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that parents’ right to raise their children is “among the ‘unalienable Rights’”
declared in the Declaration of Independence and the Ninth Amendment, but not a
judicially enforceable right).
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are several different formalist renditions of the Clause. The hardline
rendition is Robert Bork’s: The terms privileges and immunities are so
open ended that they are really just “ink blots,” which can be read to
encompass any civil right the interpreter wants to protect.13 Another
formalist position is the “nondiscrimination” approach. As David Currie14
and John Harrison explain, this view asserts that privileges and immunities
refer to state laws specifying the content of subject areas covered by
traditional fundamental rights. States have considerable latitude regarding
how to specify the content of those subject areas. But once they have
chosen the privileges and immunities that they will provide, states must
provide the legal rights on justifiably equal terms to all citizens.15
Although a tribute essay cannot settle the debates over the Privileges
or Immunities Clause or Professor Siegan’s scholarship, it can at least
suggest that Siegan was righter than most originalists now appreciate.
This essay does so by focusing on three key terms in the Privileges or
Immunities Clause: privileges, immunities, and abridging.16 Taken at
face value, these terms have no obvious connection to natural law or
rights principles. They seem therefore to confirm formalist readings of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yet appearances can be deceiving. It is important to understand the
deception here, because it highlights a dangerous tendency in researching
the original meaning of the Constitution and especially the Fourteenth
Amendment. Many prominent studies of the Fourteenth Amendment
focus on materials contemporaneous with the Amendment’s drafting and
ratification. Professor Siegan himself exemplifies this tendency; his
studies of the Privileges or Immunities Clause are primarily on “what
motivated the 128 representatives and 33 senators who favored the joint
resolution proposing the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment.”17 The debates in
the Thirty-Ninth Congress are definitely the place to start, but they are
not the only place to look. Privileges and immunities had a long
pedigree in English and American public law going back at least as early
13.

ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
166 (1990).
14. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 239 n.12, 342–51 (1985).
15. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101
YALE L.J. 1385, 1410–33, 1451–66 (1992).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”).
17. SIEGAN, supra note 8, at 47. One important exception is EARL M. MALTZ, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (2003). Maltz pays
closer attention than most to the antebellum legal concepts that shaped the debates over
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 3–51. Even so, Maltz’s discussions of antebellum
law needs to be complemented by close analysis of the moral and political theory that
informed the law.
THE LAW
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as the seventeenth century. The terms have a long association in AngloAmerican law, history, and political theory with general principles of
citizenship and the social compact. Understood in the context of the rights
of citizen-parties to the social compact, the privileges and immunities
referenced in the Fourteenth Amendment declare fundamental substantive
rights grounded in natural law and rights theory. The term abridging
confirms the same result. In Anglo-American moral theory, abridging
usually refers to “diminishing the substance of a pre-political moral right
more than necessary for its proper regulation.”
I invoke the symposium presenter’s privilege in this essay and
speculate to a large extent against the grain of previous scholarship.
Since most scholarship has been done on the legislative and ratification
debates about the Amendment without sufficient regard for antebellum
moral and political context, I focus here on elucidating that context even
if doing so abstracts from the sources most immediate to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification. This essay surveys colonial charters and
relevant provisions of the Articles of Confederation—but most of all Sir
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.18 Blackstone’s
discussion explains how the terms privileges and immunities are intertwined
with natural law and natural rights principles. In Blackstone’s conception,
all governments are obligated by natural law to secure the natural rights
of their subjects, but the English polity of his day succeeded more than
most at doing so. Precisely speaking, privileges and immunities refer not to
natural rights, but rather to the rights the English polity established in
positive law to secure natural rights—specifically natural rights relating
to life, liberty, and property. If Blackstone’s usages are representative,
when privileges and immunities are used as terms of art in connection
with constitutionalism and citizenship, they refer to positive laws that
secure natural rights, especially rights that connect directly to the moral
rights of life, liberty, and property. In addition, privileges and immunities
refer to rights-securing legal protections that may properly be reserved
for the special enjoyment of citizens who pledge their allegiance to the
republican political community.
Of course, there are good reasons why Blackstone’s Commentaries
might not be representative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Commentaries were written a century before the Fourteenth Amendment

18. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (W.S. Hein
& Co. 1992) (1766).
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was ratified. The Commentaries were influential in American legal and
political practice before and shortly after the American Revolution, but
by the Civil War, they had been supplanted to some extent by homegrown American legal treatises. It is also probable that American usages
of privileges and immunities evolved significantly from 1766 to the postCivil War period. The United States consisted not, as Blackstone’s England
did, of one monarchical government, but of a collection of republican
governments. Furthermore, the United States’ experience with slavery
over the first half of the nineteenth century must have colored perceptions
of privileges and immunities.
Nevertheless, in this essay I hope to suggest that Blackstone’s
Commentaries are an indispensable aid in deciphering what privileges
and immunities mean as terms of art in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Leading scholarship on the Fourteenth Amendment assumes that “most
American lawyers began their legal education with Blackstone and the
common law.”19 Offhand statements like these make it all the more
surprising that scholarship has noted Blackstone’s treatment of privileges
and immunities in passing without giving the careful interpretation it
deserves.20 Even assuming American jurists and lawyers did not read
Blackstone himself, his usages of privileges and immunities—properly
adjusted for changing American history and political conditions—may
capture the background assumptions that those jurists and lawyers
assumed to be true when they used the terms.
Blackstone’s discussion is valuable for two main reasons. First,
Blackstone makes sense of and lends credibility to the discussion of
privileges and immunities in Corfield v. Coryell, an 1823 circuit court
decision widely regarded as the most important legal source relevant to
the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.21 Second,
and more generally, Blackstone’s discussion suggests that the fundamentalrights interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause fits antebellum
law and political theory more closely than the nondiscrimination view
and more closely than is commonly thought.
Before proceeding, let me make a few disclaimers. First, this essay to
a large extent abstracts away from questions about what kinds of topics
are covered under privileges or immunities. As I will suggest through
quotations and case examples, it was widely assumed that privileges and
immunities covered positive law rights securing property and the right to
practice a commercial trade. This essay abstracts away from questions
19.
(1998).
20.
21.
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about whether religious freedom, associational freedom, the right of selfdefense, the right to a jury trial, or other similar rights could count as
privileges or immunities. Separately, even for topics like property and
the right to practice a commercial trade, I avoid questions about whether
privileges and immunities could refer to all positive laws securing those
natural rights, or to some subset of those rights.
Second, this essay is mostly positive and only modestly normative.
For the most part, it aims to explain assumptions about the relationship
between natural rights and positive law that are crucial in providing
context for privileges and immunities. The essay is normative only to
the extent that it makes these assumptions plausible enough for contemporary
readers to understand and appreciate. Strong arguments may be made
whether the Fourteenth Amendment is “unworkable or incoherent.”22
This essay abstracts away from those arguments.
Third, this essay tries as much as possible to refrain from taking sides
in debates about originalist methodology. Readers interested in the finer
points of textualism, original understanding, and intentionalism can refer
to the footnotes for helpful introductions to the literature.23 Blackstone’s
Commentaries and the other sources canvassed here may be more
relevant to one method of inquiry than another.24 But they are surely
relevant to any originalist interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Whatever the species of originalism, the Commentaries are a
legal version of a Rosetta Stone.
Fourth, to focus on what the Privileges or Immunities Clause
means, this essay abstracts away from questions about which branch
or branches of the federal government are best positioned to construe the

22. Roderick Hills, Jr., Back to the Future: How the Bill of Rights Might Be About
Structure After All, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 992–1002 (1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra
note 19).
23. See, e.g., John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83 (2003) (explaining the differences between Originalism
Mark I, which emphasizes the public political meaning of laws, with Originalism Mark
II, which demands a study of history in the interpretation of authoritative text); Vasan
Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134–48 (2003) (examining the debates among
originalists regarding whether to view texts according to the subjective intent of the
original drafters, or according to an objective understanding); Gary Lawson, Conservative or
Constitutionalist?, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 81–82 (2002) (explaining the difference
between theories of judicial behavior and theories of interpretation).
24. They are probably more relevant to textualists than to intentionalists or original
understanding interpreters.
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Clause and carry its prescriptions into effect in practice. Most scholarship
that endorses the fundamental rights interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause typically also endorses vigorous judicial enforcement
of the Clause.25 While this essay makes the fundamental rights interpretation
more respectable, it makes no claims for or against strong judicial review.
Obviously, to the extent current law allows for and the Constitution
requires strong judicial review, this essay encourages more vigorous
federal judicial protection of citizens’ property and commercial rights.
But it could be that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment26 makes
the Amendment a more Congress-centered amendment than it is assumed to
be now. Separately, this essay explains privileges and immunities so as
to make them seem more determinate, and also highlights important gray
areas in the terms. Different theories of judicial review may disagree about
whether such gray areas are more appropriately left to “construction” by
the political branches or to legal interpretation by courts.27 Those
debates exceed the scope of this essay.
In short, this essay focuses on proper interpretation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause separate from the Clause’s construction. It leaves
significant detail work to complete a sound originalist interpretation of
the Clause. Yet if Blackstone’s Commentaries and other foundational
American public law sources are reliable guides, Professor Siegan had
sounder instincts about the original meaning of “privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States” than most originalists now appreciate.
II. PUBLIC LAW PRECURSORS TO THE PRIVILEGES OR
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Even though considerable scholarship has been written about the
terms privileges and immunities as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,
we are still a long way from any sort of consensus about what these
terms mean. Among many other reasons, interpreters must shed several
misconceptions before considering the Fourteenth Amendment in context.
The most common misconception is to assume that privileges and
immunities are entirely creations of positive law. In everyday conversation
and modern legal usage, privileges and immunities often refer to

25. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 9, at 131–52; SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES,
supra note 2, at 83–108.
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). The terms legislation and
appropriate may impose a nondelegation doctrine on legislation under Section Five
comparable to the nondelegation doctrine required under Article I of the Constitution.
27. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5–15 (1999).
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entitlements created as a special favor or perquisite to the recipient. (I
used privilege in this sense in Part I, when I appealed to the “symposium
presenter’s privilege.”) Privileges and immunities were used in antebellum
law in this sense. For example, in nineteenth century constitutional law,
a privilege often referred to an exclusive, chartered monopoly granted by
the sovereign.28 At the other extreme, privileges and immunities may be
understood as synonyms for moral terms like liberty, right, or freedom.29
Although this essay does not claim to settle such issues conclusively,
it can suggest why a middle ground is more plausible than either of these
two alternatives. Sound originalist analysis must be open to the possibility
that a term may be used differently in different contexts. A purchase and
sale agreement, for example, uses the term purchase differently from the
words of purchase in a conveyance. So too with privileges and immunities.
There are plausible reasons for suspecting that, as of the Civil War,
privileges and immunities had meanings specific to contexts associated
with republican citizenship that they did not have in other contexts. In
many contexts before the Civil War, privileges and immunities associated
with citizenship referred to civil laws established to secure important
moral rights considered crucial to the political community. In these
contexts, privileges and immunities relate to both natural and civil law.
They are creations of positive law, but with the purpose of carrying the
natural law into effect.
This Part briefly surveys some of the most prominent public law
usages of privileges and immunities in contexts associated with citizenship.
Although these usages have been duly noted and cited in judicial
opinions30 and scholarship,31 these works have not sufficiently appreciated
the precise character of the privileges and immunities so referenced.

28. See MALTZ, supra note 17, at 28–29.
29. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(concluding that privileges and immunities refer to fundamental moral rights); AMAR,
supra note 19, at 167–69 (concluding that privileges, immunities, rights, and freedom are
interchangeable terms); Harrison, supra note 15, at 1416 (same).
30. See, e.g., Saenz, 526 U.S. at 523 n.2 (noting references to privileges and
immunities in seventeenth century American colonial charters).
31. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 19, at 167–68 (noting references to privileges and
immunities in American treaties regulating the subjection of foreign subjects to U.S.
jurisdiction).
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A good place to start is Article IV of the Articles of Confederation:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these
states (paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice, excepted) shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and
the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any
other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce,
subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants
thereof respectively. Provided that such restriction shall not extend so far as to
prevent the removal of property imported into any state to any other state of
which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties, or
restriction, shall be laid by any state on the property of the United States, or
either of them.32

Even though this Clause is repetitive in some respects, its core meaning is
tolerably clear. Before the Revolution, each of the colonies was bound
by its own charter and general imperial law to respect the rights of
subjects in other English colonies. In his Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States, Justice Joseph Story explained:
[A]lthough the colonies were independent of each other in respect to their
domestic concerns, they were not wholly alien to each other. On the contrary,
they were fellow subjects, and for many purposes one people. . . . The
commercial intercourse of the colonies, . . . was regulated by the general laws of
the British [E]mpire; and could not be restrained, or obstructed by colonial
legislation.33

Article IV picked up where these colonial and English guarantees left
off. The Article guaranteed that free inhabitants in one state could enjoy
in other states the legal rights that the English government had previously
guaranteed them when they were English subjects traveling to sister
colonies. Article IV replaced a guarantee enforced by English courts and
the English Crown with a half constitutional, half international treaty
guarantee, enforceable in state courts.
Important in this economic liberties Symposium, these colonial and
confederate rights include rights relating to property and trade. Article
IV specifically guarantees “the people of each state”—whoever they
are—“all the privileges of trade and commerce,” and it also guarantees
that state economic regulations “shall not extend so far as to prevent the
removal of property imported into any state.”34 Justice Story assumed
that colonial and general British law guaranteed each colonist a right, “as
a British subject, [to] inherit[] lands by descent in every other colony”

32.
33.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, § 1 (U.S. 1781).
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: WITH A PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES
AND STATES, BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 178, at 164 (1833).
34. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, § 1 (U.S. 1781).
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and to engage in “commercial intercourse” consistent with “the general
laws of the British [E]mpire.”35 Blackstone’s Commentaries confirms as
much when it examines the rights of aliens and English born subjects.36
Aliens could not acquire real estate—at least not without automatically
forfeiting it to the crown—they could only acquire personalty except as
a matter of “indulgence”; they could trade and work freely, but only
subject to higher duties.37 By reverse inference, citizens could acquire
realty and personalty as of right, work and trade, and were able to do so
subject to lower duties.
Article Four, Section Two, Clause One of the U.S. Constitution
(called here “the Comity Clause”) does in the Constitution what Article
IV does in the Articles of Confederation. The Comity Clause reads:
“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”38 Although this Clause is
more laconic than Article IV of the Articles, here less is more. Article
IV of the Articles is somewhat repetitive, and the repetitions create
internal inconsistencies. As Federalist No. 42 observed, Article IV
secures different rights to “free inhabitants” and “the people of each
state,” and it holds out the possibility that a free inhabitant of one state,
who is not entitled to certain rights of citizenship in that state, may
demand “all privileges and immunities of free citizens” in other states.39
By contrast, the Comity Clause focuses on a uniform set of people—
citizens in each state—and a uniform set of rights—privileges and
immunities.
For the most part, the Articles and the Comity Clause were not using
old terms in new contexts. The term privilege was being used as a term
of art for fundamental English rights as early as the beginning of the
seventeenth century. Perhaps the most prominent early usage of the
term comes in a Protestation adopted by the British Parliament, authored
by Sir Edward Coke in 1621, in protest against King Charles I.40 In the

35. 1 STORY, supra note 33, at 164.
36. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 354.
37. Id. at *360; see also 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 46–54,
60–61 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1827) (comparing and contrasting the rights and disabilities of
aliens and citizens in their powers to acquire and dispose of real estate).
38. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
39. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 215, 220 (James Madison).
40. JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF PRIVATE PASSAGES OF STATE:
VOLUME 1: 1618–29 (1721), available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?
compid=70138.
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course of protesting the King’s domestic, religious, and foreign policies,
Parliament insisted “[t]hat the Liberties, Franchises, Priviledges [sic],
and Jurisdictions of Parliament, are the ancient and undoubted Birthright and Inheritance of the Subjects of England . . . .”41 Parliament
made this claim not to assert any natural rights of English subjects, but
rather to assert coequal governance rights in “affairs concerning the
King, State and Defence of the Realm, and of the Church of England”
and to claim freedom of speech for members of Parliament to discuss
these subjects.42 Even so, privileges and the other terms of art mentioned
make sense as placeholders for substantive rights that Englishmen enjoy
by virtue of being Englishmen.
In the same period, privileges and immunities were also being used in
American colonial charters. In Virginia’s 1606 colonial charter, King
James I granted to “all and every the Persons being our Subjects . . . all
Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other Dominions,
to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding and born, within
this our Realm of England, or any other of our said Dominions.”43 The
1629 Charter of the Colony of New Plymouth guaranteed that “all and
every the Subjects of [King James and his successors], which shall [go]
to and [inhabit] within [the chartered colony], and every of their
Children . . . shall have and enjoy all liberties and Immunities of free and
[natural Subjects] within any of the [Dominions] of” the English Crown.44
These and similar guarantees to other colonies45 supplied the background

41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
The First Charter of Virginia—1606, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3783, 3788 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1993)
(1906) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
44. Charter of the Colony of New Plymouth Granted to William Bradford and His
Associates—1629, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
43, at 1841, 1856–57 (archaic usages conformed to modern English).
45. See, e.g., Charter of Carolina—1663, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 43, at 2743, 2747 (“liberties, franchises, and priviledges
[sic]”); Charter of Maryland—1632, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 43, at 1669, 1681 (“We will also . . . firmly charge, constitute, ordain, and
command . . . that all . . . Subjects and Liege-Men of US . . . [shall enjoy] all Privileges,
Franchises and Liberties of this our Kingdom of England . . . and the same may use and
enjoy in the same manner as our Liege-Men born . . . within our said Kingdom of
England, without Impediment, Molestation, Vexation, Impeachment, or Grievance of
Us”); Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations—1663, reprinted in 6 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 43, at 3211, 3220 (“[T]he subjects . . .
shall have and enjoye all libertyes and immunityes of ffree [sic] and naturall [sic]
subjects within any the dominions of” the crown “as if they, and every of them, were
borne within the realme of England.”).
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that the Founders and Justice Story assumed when they construed Article
IV of the Articles of Confederation and the Comity Clause.
Of course, a complete analysis of privileges and immunities would
need to determine whether the terms evolved in meaning from 1600 to
1868. The terms certainly did develop in some respects. In particular,
before 1776, in the contexts relevant here, privileges and immunities
referred to the legal liberties of English subjects—established to specify
and give effect to the moral guarantees agreed to as part of the unwritten
constitution established between the crown and Parliament on behalf of
English subjects everywhere. In the United States after 1776, privileges
and immunities referred to more or less the same legal and moral
freedoms—but as established by and for the benefit of republican citizens.
There might have been other similarly serious developments that account
for changes in English government, changes in American government,
understandings about the proper bounds of church and state, and other
factors. Even accounting for such changes, however, as of 1868, privileges
and immunities of citizenship probably referred to a collection of legal
rights securing moral rights particularly associated with membership in a
free government constituted on Anglo-American political principles.
III. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES
The authorities canvassed in the previous Part help focus the issue, but
they do not settle it. Those authorities suggest that privileges and immunities
of citizenship in an American republic refer to “legal rights established
to specify and give effect to moral rights to which members of the
political community are entitled according to a generalized AngloAmerican political tradition.” But those legal rights could be construed
in one of several different ways—the nondiscrimination or the fundamental
rights interpretations. Here is where Blackstone’s Commentaries are
helpful. The Commentaries lend strong support to the fundamental rights
reading.
After defining the nature of law and English law,46 the Commentaries
begin in earnest by explaining the absolute—or moral, prepolitical, and
inalienable—rights of individuals.47 After reviewing how Magna Carta
and other foundational English laws secure absolute rights, William
Blackstone expounds on the social compact more generally:
46.
47.

See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *2–115.
See id. at *117.
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Thus much for the declaration of our rights and liberties. The rights themselves
thus defined by [Magna Carta and the other discussed] statutes, consist in a
number of private immunities; which will appear, from what has been premised,
to be indeed no other, than either that residuum of natural liberty, which is not
required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or else
those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the
natural liberties so given up by individuals. These therefore were formerly,
either by inheritance or purchase, the rights of all mankind; but, in most other
countries of the world being now more or less debased and destroyed, they at
present may be said to remain, in a peculiar and emphatical manner, the rights
of the people of England. And these may be reduced to three principal or
primary articles; the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty; and
the right of private property: because as there is no other known method of
compulsion, or of abridging man’s natural free will, but by an infringement or
diminution of one or other of these important rights, the preservation of these,
inviolate, may justly be said to include the preservation of our civil immunities
in their largest and most extensive sense.48

This passage is bound to invite competing interpretations—consider, for
example, Blackstone’s slightly conflicting references to “private immunities”
and “civil immunities.” Nevertheless, Blackstone’s exposition is more
discursive than most legal documents. Blackstone makes patent several
assumptions about privileges and immunities that are only latent in
practical documents.
Blackstone presumes that Englishmen enjoy natural rights under
natural law. If that were not clear enough from his several references to
“natural liberty,” it is reinforced by the fact that he speaks of the Magna
Carta and other foundational statutes as “declaration[s]” of natural
liberty. In principle, these foundational statutes do not give English
subjects new rights; they merely “declare” that the subjects have in civil
law rights they already enjoy as a matter of natural law. Later, Blackstone
stresses that “the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the
enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the
immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace
without that mutual assistance and intercourse, which is gained by the
institution of friendly and social communities.”49
In addition, these natural rights are the rights popularly associated
with Locke—life (“personal security”), liberty, and private property.50
Blackstone reinforces this point in the rest of the same chapter. He
suggests that life, liberty, and property may “usually [be] summed up in

48. Id. at *125.
49. Id. at *120.
50. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 87, at 323 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1698) (justifying political society on the basis of a
power that man “hath by Nature . . . to preserve his Property, that is, his Life, Liberty and
Estate”).
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one general appellation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind.”51
This natural liberty is not a right to any guaranteed handouts or specific
policies from the government. It is instead a negative liberty, a domain
of non-interference. It “consists properly in a power of acting as one
thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature.”52
That said, Blackstone is not totally clear about how moral privileges
and immunities acquire legal or customary force under the unwritten
English constitution. On one hand, they might have authority in natural
reason. The natural rights of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property, Blackstone assumes, are “the rights of all mankind.”
On the other hand, the foundation might be community authority,
specifically in the form of the English people’s consent to those
principles. Blackstone suggests as much when he acknowledges that the
natural rights in question are “in a peculiar and emphatical manner, the
rights of the people of England” because they have been “more or less
debased or destroyed” elsewhere. In this respect, too, Blackstone
follows Locke: While political society is judged by how well it secures
basic natural rights, it also depends crucially on the consent of the
governed.53
In any case, in organized political society, English subjects exchange
natural rights for positive law rights—on condition that the society
pledge to make its common end the preservation and enlargement of
natural rights; specifically life, liberty, and property.54 It then follows
that rights and liberties may be understood to differ subtly from
privileges and immunities. I have no doubt that these terms were used
quite often as synonyms during Blackstone’s day and thereafter.
Nevertheless, the terms may also be used more precisely with different
emphases. Rights to some extent and liberties especially refer to natural
rights, the moral freedom one enjoys independent from and prior to
one’s participation in civil society. Privileges and immunities, by
contrast, refer to legal rights, specifically the positive laws and rights
that protect and give determination to moral freedom in organized

51. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *121.
52. Id.
53. See LOCKE, supra note 50, at §§ 95–97, at 330–32. Consent is a problematic
concept in social compact theory. For standard criticisms, see John Rawls, Justice as
Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 178 (1958); Jeremy Waldron, John Locke: Social Contract
Versus Political Anthropology, 51 REV. POL. 3, 6–8 (1989).
54. Accord BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *120–21, *125.
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political society. Privileges and immunities may also cover natural rights,
but only inasmuch as the positive rights are so intertwined with the
natural rights that it is impossible to separate the two.
Next, even though privileges and immunities secure natural rights, a
people and government may reserve them, consistently with natural law,
only to members of that political community.55 Richard Epstein finds
this condition “dubious,” finds it not “defensible as a matter of first
principle under any system of limited government,” and complains about
the “tension between the positivist view that all rights emanate from the
state, and the well-established natural law principle that on questions of
title to land, prior in time is higher in right.”56 Blackstone, however,
does not presume as sharp a separation between the positivist and natural
law principles as Epstein suggests. Ideally, the law of nature requires
individuals in organized society to treat all their fellow men decently.
But without such ties, domestic politics can go tribal. When it does,
necessity steps in and excuses a people if it conquers its competitors and
reserves the advantages of civil society only for its own members.
Natural rights, Blackstone presumes, exist in a world of closed and
competing political societies. As a matter of prudence, it is humane for
free states to extend civil rights to aliens most of the time. But in cases
of emergency, states may reserve the advantages of citizenship for
individuals who have the loyalty to use those advantages with equal
respect for fellow citizens—and the moral formation to use those
advantages responsibly.57
Finally, although Blackstone refers to these positive law rights generally
as “civil immunities,” this genus covers two different species of particular
privileges and immunities. With some overlap, “civil privileges” refer to
entitlements that replicate in positive law the general substance of natural
rights. “Private immunities” refer to the domains of noninterference English
subjects enjoy as residual rights to do that which is not prohibited by
particular civil laws.
If one weaves these various implications together, privileges and
immunities associated with membership in the English compact presume
something like the following. Men enjoy natural rights, especially rights
to life, liberty, or property. These rights are not rights to particular state
policies, particular outcomes, or particular personal results; they are
55. I thank Jeremy Rabkin for encouraging me to make this point more explicit.
56. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons, supra note 10, at 341–42.
57. For other treatments of the tensions between natural international rights and
the treatment of aliens, see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64–68 (1941), and
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS: OR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS bk II, ch.
8, §§ 99–115, at 235–41 (M.D. Vattel ed., S. & E. Butler 1805) (1758).
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rather domains of practical moral discretion, freedoms within which men
may determine the ends for which their lives, liberties, and properties are
used. In any case, privileges and immunities are positive laws, but with
a substance informed by a common political morality. That common
morality is informed—with some tension, to be sure—by two sources:
the natural law and rights moral theory commonly associated with Locke
and Blackstone, and the laws and customs that have traditionally defined,
secured, and enlarged natural rights in English practice. By the same
token, the government may legislate and enforce laws so as to protect
privileges and immunities only for those who have consented to join the
political society. The government and society may be bound to respect
some minimal rules of decency set by the laws of nature in their dealings
with non-members; but they may reserve complex legal protections for
property, the rights to buy and sell goods, and other similar liberties for
the citizenry alone.
IV. PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES: THE AMERICAN TURN
Blackstone lends weight to the fundamental rights readings of privileges
and immunities because his discussion accords with the self-understanding
of American statesmen and jurists after the American Revolution. Recall
that Blackstone’s discussion of privileges and immunities contained an
ambiguity: Privileges and immunities were civil laws that specified the
prescriptions of both natural law and English customary, legal, and
political traditions. It is reasonable to suspect that, after the American
Revolution, Blackstone’s American students would stress the natural law
over the English traditions.58
Americans who cut their teeth on Blackstone assumed that they were
entitled to Blackstone’s absolute rights on a par with English subjects
living in England. Blackstone’s “absolute” rights are the “alienable Rights”
to which Americans referred in the Declaration of Independence.59 For
Blackstone’s American students, privileges and immunities were therefore
the civil laws established “to secure these [unalienable] Rights.”60 Now,
even in a country organized around natural rights and “the Laws of

58. Or, to be more precise, they respected natural law and English traditions and
practices consistent with natural law over English traditions and practices inconsistent
with natural law.
59. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
60. Id.
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Nature and of Nature’s God,”61 English and homegrown legal custom
could still inform substantially the content of privileges and immunities.
As the Declaration concedes, “[p]rudence . . . will dictate that Governments
long established should not be changed for light and transient Causes;
and accordingly all Experience hath shewn, that Mankind” hold on long
to “the Forms [of government] to which they are accustomed.”62
Notwithstanding their differences with the British monarchy and
Parliament, American Revolutionaries regarded English custom, law,
and political practices both as their own and as effective at securing
natural rights.
In the period leading up to the Revolution, Americans used the terms
privileges and immunities in this sense. Revolutionaries assumed that
privileges and immunities established substantive standards of conduct,
and they criticized the British and colonial governments for their failures
to respect Americans’ substantive rights. For example, Thomas Jefferson
wrote two summaries remonstrating the English King and Parliament for
violating the American colonists’ natural rights.63 In a preface to one of
them, Arthur Lee, an Englishman, argued:
[I]n justice bound to our country, and ourselves, and that fidelity we owe, Sir, to
you, as our Sovereign, we openly declare, that the whole proceedings against
our brethren in America, who are entitled, in common with ourselves, to the
privileges of men, and the liberties, franchises, and protection of Englishmen,
are in open violation of the natural laws of equity and justice.64

The privileges in this passage could refer to the local rights of
Englishmen—but probably not, because the privileges are “the privileges
of men.” More important, the “proceedings against our brethren in
America” are judged by the extent to which the English crown is
respecting “the privileges of men” and “the natural laws of equity and
justice.” Lee judges the English monarch by how well he secures civil
rights that in turn are understood to secure universal natural rights.
Privilege and immunity were also used as markers for positive laws
securing natural rights in the debate whether to scuttle the Articles of
Confederation and ratify the Constitution of 1787. For example, during
Pennsylvania’s ratification debate, Centinel argued, “Permit one of
yourselves to put you in mind of certain liberties and privileges secured
to you by the constitution of this commonwealth . . . before you

61. Id. at para. 1.
62. Id. at para. 2.
63. 2 THE WORKS
Putnam’s & Sons 1904).
64. Id. at 56.
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surrender these great and valuable privileges up forever.”65 In Federalist
No. 2, John Jay spoke of the American people as follows: “To all general
purposes we have uniformly been one people; each individual citizen
everywhere enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection.”66
Centinel and Publius disagreed about whether the new Constitution
should be ratified. But they did agree on a common set of political and
moral terms to wage the argument. By their usages, Centinel and Publius
both suggested that privileges did not repeat strictly but rather differed
slightly from rights or liberties. Equally important, by their language
both assumed that citizens were entitled to ask whether the Constitution
of 1787 did a better job securing both the moral freedom and the privileges
than the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Articles of Confederation.
Privileges were not merely whatever entitlements Pennsylvania happened to
be providing Pennsylvania citizens at the time; privileges also set a
normative standard for measuring how well Pennsylvania’s civil laws
secured Pennsylvanians’ natural and customary substantive rights.
The Federalist’s usage also confirms that privileges may be reserved
only to citizens. The Federalist’s argument for close and extended union
could not take off without first taking for granted that the states have
one connected country, to one united people—a people descended from the
same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion,
attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and
customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms and efforts, fighting side by side
throughout a long and bloody war, have established their general liberty and
independence.67

While Publius presumed that The Federalist’s audience subscribed to
principles of natural law and rights,68 here he presumes that in political
life, natural rights may be secured effectively by closed political
communities.69 Similarly, in the now-standard 1823 property case
65. CENTINEL, LETTER I, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 13, at 13 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., Murray Dry abr., 1985).
66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 5, 6–7 (John Jay).
67. Id. at 5, 6.
68. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 222, 229 (James Madison) (considering how, if
the Constitution is ratified by the necessary majority but not unanimously, the new
United States should comport themselves in relation to the non-ratifying states
consistently with “the transcendent law of nature and of nature’s God”).
69. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 6, at 20, 25 (Alexander Hamilton) (criticizing
theories of universal human rights, “which have amused us with promises of an
exemption from the imperfections, the weaknesses, and the evils incident to society in
every shape,” and promising “to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our
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Johnson v. M’Intosh, when “abstract justice” favored Indian claims, in
conflict with “those principles . . . which our own government has
adopted” to govern the distribution of land, U.S. Supreme Court Chief
Justice Marshall swallowed the injustice and sided with “the right of
society, to prescribe those rules by which property may be acquired and
preserved . . . .”70
The usages that Lee, Centinel, and Publius applied before the
Revolution and during the debates over the Constitution carried forward
into the antebellum period and into constitutional doctrine—particularly
into some of the case law on privileges and immunities under the Comity
Clause. Since we are not being exhaustive, let us consider Corfield v.
Coryell simply because it is regarded as a leading case.71 Corfield, a
Pennsylvania citizen, brought a boat into New Jersey territorial waters to
fish for oysters in violation of a New Jersey statute reserving that fishing
only to state citizens. When he sued Coryell, a New Jersey citizen, in
trespass for seizing his boat pursuant to the New Jersey statute, the suit
gave occasion for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington, riding
circuit, to determine whether the New Jersey statute unconstitutionally
denied Corfield privileges or immunities in New Jersey.72 Washington
specifically held—as will be considered at greater length below73—that
the right to fish for oysters in state waters is not a privilege or immunity
of citizens of the several states.74 In the course of rendering that holding,
however, Justice Washington rendered the following general observations
about privileges and immunities:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to
the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed
by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental
principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate.
They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state
to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to

political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote
from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue”).
70. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572 (1823).
71. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
72. Id. at 546–47, 551.
73. See infra Part V.C.
74. See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
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take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption
from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state;
may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of
citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges
deemed to be fundamental . . . .75

Washington’s observations track the Americanized understanding of
Blackstone sketched in this and the previous Part. As used in the
Comity Clause, privileges and immunities refer not to all possible claims
of government benefit or protection, but to a narrow core of “privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental.” They are so
fundamental because of the American turn—they “belong, of right, to
the citizens of all free governments.”76 Washington presumes that
privileges and immunities belonging to citizens cover the same moral
subject matter as Blackstone. What Blackstone covers by the absolute
natural rights of life, liberty, and property, Washington covers with “life
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind,”
and—again showing the Declaration of Independence’s accents—“to
pursue and obtain happiness and safety.”77 When Washington turns
from the general subject matter of privileges or immunities of citizenship
to their specific determinations, he describes many in terms of negative
liberties, or of legal rights giving structure and determination to those
liberties: the rights to travel, establish a residence, trade, be free from
arbitrary confinement, acquire and hold property, and so forth. Finally,
by holding that the right to fish in a state’s common waters does not
count as a privilege or immunity that out-of-state citizens may claim in a
sister state, Washington confirms that privileges and immunities that
belong to citizens of the United States generally differ from “the rights
which belong exclusively to the citizens of any . . . particular state.”78
Of course, Corfield still precedes the Civil War by more than a
generation. Even so, at least some leading Republicans understood
privileges or immunities of citizenship in the Blackstonian terms
emphasized in Corfield. As just one example, consider a floor speech by
Senator Lyman Trumbull in support of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
75. Id. at 551–52.
76. Emphasis added.
77. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (declaring that all
men are endowed with an unalienable right to “the Pursuit of Happiness” and that men
are entitled to institute the form of government that “shall seem most likely to them to
effect their Safety and Happiness”).
78. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
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While opining on the constitutionality of the Act, Trumbull discussed
the Comity Clause and cited Corfield as the “most elaborate” judicial
interpretation of the Clause.79 This fact is duly noted in other treatments
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s legislative history.80 Scholars do not
note as often that Trumbull singled out Corfield because it applied to the
concepts privileges, immunities, and American citizenship the general
political and moral theory of the Declaration of Independence and
Blackstone. Trumbull specifically quoted Blackstone to define civil
liberty as “no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws
and no further, as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage
of the public.”81 So at a minimum, even as late as the Civil War,
Blackstone had not entirely given way to homegrown American treatise
writers. Moreover, Trumbull praised Corfield’s discussion of privileges
and immunities specifically because Corfield related privileges and
immunities back to Blackstone and the Declaration. In the United
States, Trumbull continued, Blackstone’s definition of liberty “is the
liberty to which every citizen is entitled; that is the liberty which was
intended to be secured by the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution of the United States originally.”82
V. THE ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF THE PRIVILEGES OR
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Again, one would need to canvas a huge range of practical legal
documents, consider contrary evidence, and account for changing word
usages before concluding that privileges and immunities in the Fourteenth
Amendment track Blackstone’s usages. All the same, Blackstone’s
Commentaries do make more comprehensible and respectable fundamental
rights interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The following
two Parts suggest the implications for two different kinds of originalist
inquiry. This Part focuses on implications for the Privileges or Immunities
Clause’s plain meaning. The next Part considers implications for
general understandings, abstracted from the Clause’s specific public
textual meaning, of the Clause’s likely meaning and effect at ratification.

79. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
80. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 15, at 1402–03.
81. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull)
(quoting, with minor variations, 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *121).
82. Id.
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A. Privileges or Immunities
Scholarship on the Privileges or Immunities Clause sorts itself out into
three general interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.83
Two have already been mentioned, the fundamental rights approach and
the nondiscrimination approach. A third is the “incorporationist” approach
proposed by Justice Black84 and more recently by Michael Kent Curtis85
and Akhil Amar.86 This approach holds that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause incorporates by reference and applies to the states some or all of
the individual rights that the Bill of Rights makes applicable to the
federal government.87 Blackstone’s treatment of privileges and immunities
provides significant support to the fundamental rights interpretation,
qualified support to the incorporationist reading, and significant challenges
to the nondiscrimination reading.
1. Fundamental Rights
Blackstone’s treatment confirms the fundamental rights reading in two
important respects. Blackstone provides a point of contact with AngloAmerican natural law and natural rights political morality. Contemporary
judicial opinions and scholarship are written by authors who have little
or no direct familiarity with this political morality. It is quite easy for
such authors unsuspectingly to read terms like privileges and immunities
anachronistically or out of context. When Blackstone expounds on
privileges and immunities associated with membership in a free society,
his exposition is elaborate enough to help modern readers identify a
conceptual context—membership in a free political society—in which

83. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
applies to the states only a few core rights of citizenship that the Constitution of 1787
applies to the federal government expressly or by implication. See The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). I assume the Slaughter-House Cases do not
accurately reflect the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s original meaning for reasons
explained by John Harrison, supra note 15, at 1414–16.
84. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71–72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
85. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 64–65 (1986).
86. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 387–89 (2005);
AMAR, supra note 19, at 166–69 (1998).
87. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71–72.
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privileges and immunities had definitions as terms of art different from
other usages.
Separately, Blackstone makes Corfield v. Coryell more respectable and
understandable.88 Judges and scholars who incline toward the fundamental
rights reading lean heavily on Corfield to explain how privileges and
immunities were understood as terms of art in contexts associated with
citizenship during Reconstruction. Justice Thomas has called Corfield a
“landmark opinion,”89 and Professor Siegan called it a “famous pronouncement
on the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause of article IV.”90
Scholars who disagree suggest that Corfield was something of an outlier
in antebellum case law on constitutional privileges and immunities.91
Or, even if Corfield was widely cited and respected, critics suggest,
Washington’s opinion seems “loose language”—incoherent dicta unable
to sustain the weight the fundamental rights reading requires of it.92
Blackstone’s exposition on privileges and immunities does not refute
these criticisms by itself, but it does point the way toward such a
refutation. On one hand, as the previous Part explained, Blackstone’s
exposition helps make important parts of Washington’s opinion more
coherent, so Corfield seems more than mere loose language. On the
other hand, Blackstone’s exposition provides a useful conceptual razor
to cut the least sensible parts of Corfield from the most sensible. For
example, Corfield is often criticized because at one point Justice
Washington suggested that the right to vote may count as a privilege or
immunity of general United States citizenship.93 This suggestion, critics
of Corfield are quick to point out, went against the weight of antebellum
law.94 Blackstone’s exposition helps explain why, in context of the
natural law and rights political morality that prevailed during Reconstruction,
Corfield erred in how it classified the right to vote. A privilege or
immunity of citizenship refers to a positive law right securing or
specifying the free exercise of an absolute personal right, like life,
liberty, or property. In Blackstone’s conception, the right to vote
88. I am grateful to Larry Solum for prompting me to make this connection more
explicit. See Posting of Lawrence Solum to Legal Theory Blog, Larry Solum,
“Bezanson on Art and the Constitution,” Legal Theory Blog, May 8, 2008, available at
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2008/05/bezanson-on-art.html (May 8, 2008, 06:22
EST).
89. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 524–25 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
90. SIEGAN, supra note 8, at 48.
91. See, e.g., MALTZ, supra note 17, at 32 (portraying Corfield as a “widely-cited”
but “somewhat equivocal exception” to the dominant trend antebellum Comity Clause
case law).
92. CURRIE, supra note 14, at 347 n.131.
93. See 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
94. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 15, at 1417. For case law contrary to Corfield
on this point, see Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797).
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does not secure an absolute right, it is instead a relative right, a right
created in and by a social group for social ends.95 At the same time,
Blackstone’s exposition helps explain why leading jurists might regard
Corfield as “good law” generally even if it applied general principles
mistakenly in the specific case of the right to vote.
For example, in floor statements on a draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Senator Jacob Howard cited Corfield as “some intimation
of what will probably be the opinion of the judiciary” about the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, and he called Justice Washington a “very learned
and excellent judge.”96 In the next Congress, however, Senator Howard
took the floor to insist strenuously that the Fourteenth Amendment had
not made the right to vote a privilege or immunity of United States
citizenship.97 Maybe Howard was trying to have it both ways. Legislators
often repudiate portions of bills that turn out later to be unpopular as
laws. Yet Blackstone’s exposition clarifies why Senator Howard’s
statements might both have been perfectly sincere and consistent with
one another.
Blackstone’s exposition on privileges and immunities does call previous
fundamental rights interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
into question in some respects. Some previous interpretations—for example,
Professor Siegan’s98—suggest that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protects fundamental rights on terms at least similar and perhaps identical to
a theory of substantive due process organized around natural law fundamental
rights. Blackstone’s treatment suggests otherwise. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect
“person[s],” while the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects “citizens
of the United States.”99 The Fourteenth Amendment codifies a distinction
suggested in Blackstone and recognized by sources canvassed in Part
IV:100 A free and republican government needs to respect some general
standards of natural law when it deals with aliens, but it may secure
natural rights to its citizens with a stronger and more detailed set of
positive legal protections. It would take exhaustive research, beyond the
95. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *119.
96. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
97. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003 (1869) (statement of Sen. Howard).
98. See SIEGAN, supra note 8, at 66 (reading Representative Bingham’s floor
speeches to treat privileges or immunities, equal protection, and due process “interchangeably
to condemn oppressive state legislation”).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100. See supra notes 55–57 and 67–70 and accompanying text.
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scope of this essay, to draw the lines between the minimal standards of
natural law applicable to aliens and the standards set by privileges or
immunities of republican citizenship. But Blackstone’s Commentaries
provide important evidence suggesting the distinction matters in the
original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Richard Epstein
has recently highlighted textual and structural reasons why the citizenperson distinction matters.101 Blackstone’s Commentaries provides additional
evidence reinforcing that distinction.
2. Incorporation
Blackstone’s treatment of privileges, immunities, and natural rights
provides qualified support for incorporationist readings of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. In short, the Privileges or Immunities Clause may
make applicable on the states many rights guarantees enumerated elsewhere
in the Constitution. But to the extent the Clause does incorporate
constitutional rights guarantees, it does so not because the rights are
constitutional but because the Constitution secures fundamental moral
rights.
Corfield suggests this general relation. The right “to claim the benefit
of the writ of habeas corpus”102 is listed in Corfield as an example of a
privilege or immunity; that right is enumerated in the U.S. Constitution.103
Yet Corfield also includes among privileges and immunities the
otherwise unenumerated rights to travel for commercial purposes and to
acquire property.104 Blackstone’s Commentaries confirms the same
relation with the example of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus is
cited both as a privilege in the unwritten English constitution105 and a
necessary security for the absolute natural right of personal liberty.106
Although this essay cannot confirm the relation comprehensively,
there is at least some evidence that American jurists understood privileges
in the same way: Many constitutional rights provided examples of
citizen privileges or immunities, but constitutional rights did not
necessarily exhaust the class of privileges and immunities. For example,
in a series of Resolves preceding the Revolutionary War, the Massachusetts
people proclaimed:

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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Resolved, That there are certain essential Rights of the British Constitution
of Government, which are founded in the Law of God and Nature, and are the
common Rights of Mankind—Therefore . . . Resolved that no Man can justly take
the Property of another without his Consent . . . this inherent Right, together with
all other essential Rights, Liberties, Privileges and Immunities of the People of
Great Britain have been fully confirmed to them by Magna Charta . . . .107

The Resolves seem to confirm the incorporation reading. Eminent
domain is a privilege here, and eminent domain limitations are
enumerated in the Bill of Rights in the Fifth Amendment.108 But
properly read, the Resolves suggest that privileges cover not only eminent
domain limitations but any unenumerated and “inherent”—natural and
substantive—right that was confirmed to the British people by British
legal tradition. If this example is representative, a right need not be
enumerated to qualify as a privilege or immunity of citizenship.
3. Nondiscrimination
Blackstone’s justification for privileges and immunities creates stronger
theoretical challenges to the last interpretation: nondiscrimination.
Under this interpretation, the Privileges or Immunities Clause applies
only to subjects that have traditionally been understood as fundamental
rights—especially “private law rights of property ownership, contractual
capacity, and personal security, and access to governmental mechanisms
that protect those primary rights.”109 As to those subjects, states have
substantial discretion to structure state common law as they wish:
privileges and immunities need not secure “minimum Lockean freedoms
but rather full specification of state law on basic subjects.”110 The status
of this law as privileges and immunities imposes a side constraint on
state lawmaking. States remain generally free to specify the personal
and possessory interests that shape the law of tort, contract, and
property, as long as they do not discriminate unjustifiably on the basis of
race or other impermissible group characteristics.111
107. The Massachusetts Resolves, October 29, 1765, reprinted in PROLOGUE TO
REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, at 56
(Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959). For other colonial references, see the sources collected
by Justice Thomas in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 523–24 n.3 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
109. Harrison, supra note 15, at 1416; see CURRIE, supra note 14, at 347 n.131.
110. Harrison, supra note 15, at 1418.
111. See CURRIE, supra note 14, at 346–49; Harrison, supra note 15, at 1410–33.
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This interpretation fairly captures the understanding that states have
substantial discretion to structure local property and personal regulations
to suit local conditions and opinions. It also captures the fact that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause bars state laws that discriminate by
group characteristics in the protection of basic personal and property
based liberties. At the same time, this interpretation abstracts significantly
from the Blackstonian understanding that influenced American law
throughout much of the nineteenth century. Even if each of the states
had substantial discretion to write local laws for local conditions, on
Blackstone’s understanding all the states would in their own ways be
aiming to secure similar natural rights. On that understanding, a state
could use its regulatory powers to deny natural rights based privileges or
immunities without discriminating on the basis of race.
Let me illustrate by using the facts and a few simple variations of the
facts of the Slaughter-House Cases, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
read the Privileges or Immunities Clause to be a dead letter.112 In the
case as litigated, the Louisiana state government granted to a Louisiana
resident an exclusive and private monopoly over cattle slaughtering within
New Orleans city limits.113 The fundamental rights and nondiscrimination
interpretations dovetail on two propositions: The right to practice the
trade of cattle slaughtering counts as a fundamental right; and if, contrary to
the real facts, Louisiana had limited the slaughtering practice to whites
or white Louisianans, it would without a doubt have made a law abridging
the privileges or immunities of non-white citizens.
The fundamental rights and nondiscrimination approaches diverge on
whether a law conferring an exclusive monopoly without regard to race
abridges a privilege or immunity of citizenship. Under the nondiscrimination
approach, citizens have as privileges and immunities whatever “rights
[are] defined by state positive law,” and the Fourteenth Amendment
does not require that these rights be structured to secure “Lockean
natural rights defined without reference to the law of any state.”114 So
the excluded butchers have no claim to treatment by any standard they
are not already getting under the Louisiana monopoly law.
If Blackstone is a reliable guide, however, there is not such a sharp
separation between positive and natural law. To begin with, thanks to
Blackstone and other English and American treatise writers, American
common law in its main features secured rights with “Lockean”
substantive content. Local common law was not uniformly “Lockean,”
and local statutes could and often did break from the model, but the
112.
113.
114.

804

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
See id. at 36–44.
Harrison, supra note 15, at 1419.

CLAEYS FINAL.DOC

[VOL. 45: 777, 2008]

10/15/2008 10:05:11 AM

A Modest Tribute to Professor Siegan
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

common law that filled in the gaps made a substantive commitment
toward structuring liberty and property rights to encourage the free,
equal, and concurrent use of individual talents and energies toward
productive ends. Consider how general American common law would
have regarded a claim by any slaughterhouse in the New Orleans area to
be the sole and exclusive butcher as a matter of common law. American
common law, following English law, presumed as a “general principle . .
. that every man may fix what price he pleases upon his own property or
the use of it,” and it did so specifically to encourage every owner to
“make the most of his own.”115 Or, perhaps that would-be monopolist
and local residents might have tried to shut down competing butchers on
the ground that their slaughterhouses posed health or safety risks to
nearby residents. Under general principles of nuisance that prevailed
through the mid-twentieth century, the complaining parties would have
needed to show that the slaughterhouses created a demonstrable health
or safety threat, and that shutting the slaughterhouses down was a
proportionate response to the threat.116
Excluded butchers thus had privileges or immunities—precisely, a
legal immunity to practice the butchering trade in the domain of
practical discretion left open by the absence of common carrier or
nuisance liability. But this immunity was not an immunity merely by
virtue of being a civil specification of a general natural right. To
count as a Blackstonian immunity, it needed to secure meaningfully
the substance of a natural right to liberty and property as understood in
Anglo-American political morality—a domain of discretion structured to
encourage different individuals to use similar industrious and creative
talents productively. As Chancellor James Kent explained in his
Commentaries on American Law, “[t]he exclusive right of using and
transferring property, follows as a natural consequence, from the
perception and admission of the right itself.”117 That right, in turn,
followed from the fact that “[t]he sense of property is graciously

115. Allnutt v. Inglis, 104 Eng. Rep. 206, 208, 210 (K.B. 1810).
116. See Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 914–19 [hereinafter Claeys, Public-Use Limitations]; Eric R.
Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549,
1577–81 (2003) [hereinafter Claeys, Takings].
117. KENT, supra note 37, at 257–58.
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implanted in the human breast, for the purpose of rousing us from sloth,
and stimulating us to action . . . .”118
The same principles would apply to statutory schemes. The state
might choose to specify the natural rights of its citizens by statutory
law—say, by a Continental civilian code like Louisiana’s. Or, it might
rely generally on the common law, but then pass a few prophylactic
statutes regulating particularly dangerous or problematic threats to the
public health, safety, or public morals.119 State statutes could differ in
the details, to suit local political opinions, geographical conditions, and
other relevant considerations. A local statute could therefore also generally
grant privileges or immunities in the Slaughter-House Cases, as long as
it made a reasonable effort to secure to potential cattle slaughterers a
domain of non-interference in which to practice butchering productively,
consistent with public health and other similar obligations, in competition
with other butchers.
When privileges and immunities of citizenship are understood in this
manner, the constitutional limitations follow in straightforward fashion.
Louisiana could impose price or competition restrictions on the
slaughtering trade if the trade was part of a natural monopoly,120 but that
seems unlikely for a business as easy to enter as slaughtering.121
Louisiana could claim a legitimate interest in stopping cattle from being
slaughtered in conditions that could spread disease or food poisoning—
but the state could advance this interest in several ways short of
restricting the slaughtering business to a monopoly.122 With privileges
and immunities so understood, the Louisiana law abridged an immunity
of United States citizens.
Nondiscrimination scholars resist this line of argument for a few
reasons. One misconception holds that any system of positive law can
count as a privilege or immunity because “it is in the positive law that

118. Id. at 257.
119. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
120. But see People ex rel. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 684–89, 692–94 (N.Y.
1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting), aff’d, Budd v. People, 143 U.S. 517 (1892) (arguing that
states could impose common carrier regulations not on natural monopolies but only on
legal monopolies).
121. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 88–89 (1873) (Field,
J., dissenting) (“The naked case, unaccompanied by any public considerations, where a
right to pursue a lawful and necessary calling, previously enjoyed by every citizen, and
in connection with which a thousand persons were daily employed, is taken away and
vested exclusively for twenty-five years, for an extensive district and a large population,
in a single corporation . . . .”).
122. See id. at 103–08 (Field, J., dissenting) (considering and rejecting the rationale
suggested in text).
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[a] natural right becomes meaningful.”123 True, in most natural law and
rights theories, the institution of positive law usually secures natural
rights even without regard to the content of the natural law. For the
purposes of understanding the original meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, however, that is not the question. The question is
instead how the Clause’s likely reasonable readers understood privileges
and immunities to refer to any positive laws on covered topics, regardless of
content, or to positive laws that made some minimal efforts to
approximate the prescriptions of Blackstone and other natural rights
jurists. Nondiscrimination scholars doubt this latter possibility. They
are skeptical that privileges or immunities hardwire into constitutional
law so-called “Lockean natural rights defined without reference to the
law of any state.”124 Yet that skepticism begs the question. If privileges
and immunities are connected as explicitly to a specific substantive
conception of natural law and rights as Blackstone’s treatment suggests,125
the terms would and should have been understood by their reasonable
intended audience to lock in that substantive conception. Other
nondiscrimination scholars then raise the “ink blot” criticism126—they
doubt whether moral theories can make specific substantive prescriptions.
Although I do not profess to make any claims about constitutional moral
theories generally, I can say with certainty that this criticism does not
stick to the natural law and rights tradition associated with Locke and
Blackstone. In previous scholarship, I have shown that this tradition
gave nineteenth-century American due process, takings, and Contracts
Clause case law determinate focus.127
This essay cannot settle the former two criticisms. Yet there is at least
some evidence suggesting that privileges and immunities refer to civil
rights securing natural rights to life, liberty, and property as understood
within a substantive theory of fundamental rights informed by Locke,
Blackstone, Kent, and other similar theorists and jurists.

123. Harrison, supra note 15, at 1419 n.138.
124. Id. at 1419.
125. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
126. BORK, supra note 13, at 166.
127. See Claeys, Public-Use Limitations, supra note 116, at 914–28; Claeys,
Takings, supra note 116, at 1574–1644; see also MALTZ, supra note 17, at 86–87
(concluding that Justice Field’s dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases
accorded with free labor natural rights principles reflected in important antebellum legal
precedents).
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B. Abridging
The verb used in the Privileges or Immunities Clause confirms the
same relation. The Privileges or Immunities Clause’s operative verb is
abridging.128 Definitionally and conceptually, the verb abridge presumes
that the thing that is not supposed to be abridged has a substance
independent from the government action abridging it.
At the founding, through the Civil War, and as a legal and moral term
of art, the verb abridge was used quite often as a synonym for diminish
and an antonym of enlarge. Blackstone’s Commentaries illustrate how
abridge operates in the context of legal practice built on natural rights
moral philosophy. In the same passage in which he introduces his readers
to privileges or immunities, Blackstone declares:
[A]s there is no other known method of compulsion, or of abridging man’s
natural free will, but by an infringement or diminution of one or other of these
important rights, the preservation of these inviolate may justly be said to include
the preservation of our civil immunities in their largest and most extensive
sense.129

English subjects’ civil immunities—their privileges and immunities—
have prepolitical substance because they are the determinations, under
English positive law, of English subjects’ moral rights in the state of
nature. English law does not create or establish those immunities—it
“preserv[es]” immunities Englishmen already had by virtue of the laws
of nature. Those immunities are legal expressions of a moral interest
with which English subjects are endowed, namely, “free will.” This free
will is not equivalent to arbitrary or unlimited license; in the passage that
Senator Trumbull picked up later, Blackstone defines “[p]olitical . . . or
civil, liberty, which is that of a member of society, [as] no other than
natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is
necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the publick.”130
Those limitations justify a government’s actions when it defines citizens’
general domain of noninterference in positive law, or when it restrains
one person from invading another’s domain. The substantive right and
its limitations define when actors—public or private—diminish that
substantive moral interest in “free will,” by “infring[ing]” or
“dimin[ishing]” English subjects’ civil privileges or immunities. When
such acts diminish Englishmen’s free will, Blackstone’s primary term of
art is compel. When such acts that diminish freedom without direct

128.
129.
130.
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compulsion, Blackstone’s term is abridging. Abridging is the backstop
term for all direct or indirect limitations on moral freedom.
The Constitution, as amended through the Fourteenth Amendment,
uses abridge more or less consistently with Blackstone’s usage. The
most powerful illustration for this understanding is in the First
Amendment. The Free Speech Clause orders Congress to make “no law
abridging the freedom of speech.”131 Modern textualists are tempted to
put the emphases on “no law” and “speech,” so that the Clause bars
virtually all speech regulations. But read against the context of natural
law and rights theory, the emphases ought to be on abridging and freedom.
By speaking in terms of a freedom of speech, the First Amendment does
not establish a new right but rather declares the existence of a natural
right—a moral and prepolitical interest preceding the Constitution. This
right is a negative liberty to determine the use and enjoyment of one’s
speech, consistent with the equal rights of others—for example, to an
accurate reputation—and the legitimate needs of the public—to a decent
public morality. As Philip Hamburger has explained, at the founding,
when politicians, journalists, or preachers spoke about laws affecting
speech, they overwhelmingly assumed that governments could regulate
speech—by passing positive laws providing real life determination to the
natural law limitations not to use one’s speech to injure the natural rights
of others or the legitimate interests of the public.132 That is why governments
could regulate133 seditious libel, for example, without abridging speech.
Consider how John Marshall justified the seditious libel laws in the
Alien and Sedition Act.134 Marshall considered the possibility that the
First Amendment literally said no law could restrain speech rights.135
For Marshall, if the First Amendment had meant to codify the “no law”
reading, Congress should have used the verb respecting, as it did in the

131. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
132. See Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 944–55 (1993).
133. To be precise, at least the Federalists assumed the government could regulate
seditious libel.
134. John Marshall, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 22,
1799), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 136 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987). Although Henry Lee is often credited with authoring this minority report,
Marshall was the likely author. See Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report:
John Marshall and the Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435,
435–46 (2007).
135. Marshall, supra note 134, at 138.
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Establishment Clause—not the verb abridging.136 Marshall understood
the freedoms of speech and press to refer to “a liberty to publish, free
from previous restraint, any thing [sic] and every thing [sic] at the
discretion of the printer only, but not the liberty of spreading with
impunity false and scandalous slanders which may destroy the peace and
mangle the reputation of an individual or of a community.”137 For
Marshall, those limitations on slander and sedition came from natural
law and English common law. A government action did not abridge free
speech if it restrained exercise of “the liberty of spreading . . . false and
scandalous slanders.” That liberty fell outside the substance of the Free
Speech Clause.
The other relevant use of abridge in the Constitution as of the Civil
War is Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, which specifies:
“[W]hen the right to vote at any [specified] election . . . is denied to any
of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged . . . the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced . . . .”138 Here, the term abridged
is read most reasonably as sweeping in any government action
diminishing the right to vote without technically denying it. Section
Two varies slightly from the template provided in the First Amendment
and in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. The substantive right
in Section Two is not a fundamental natural right but rather the right to
vote, specifically the right of males twenty-one and older to vote, as
declared in Section Two itself. John Harrison has relied on this fact to
conclude that abridge may mean in some contexts “discriminate
formally against.”139 In his interpretation, the vote is a creature of state
government and will be more or less meaningful depending on what
officers are elected or appointed.140 That said, to determine what abridged
means in context, it does not matter for what officers the voter may vote.
What does matter is, whatever officers the state makes electable,
whether the state allows all males who are twenty-one or older to vote.
That baseline has a substance independent of state law in Section Two of
the Constitution.141 Important here, the right to vote may therefore be
abridged—that is, diminished, in the same sense in which freedom of
speech may be diminished by laws contrary to the First Amendment.
The implications for Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
should by now be clear. Textually, state laws that respect, define,
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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protect, or enlarge the general substance of fundamental natural Blackstonian
rights regulate such privileges and immunities. According to Corfield’s
description, such regulations limit the free exercise of rights as necessary
to “subject [freedom] to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole.”142 State laws that restrain
those rights more than necessary for “the general good of the whole,”
however, abridge such rights, in violation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
Of course, it could be that, by Reconstruction, the term abridge had a
secondary meaning, similar to the one Harrison proposes, something like
“withhold unjustifiably a benefit provided to a race or another class.”
Scholars have found examples in which Reconstruction era actors used
abridge in this sense.143 For example, in debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment, Representative Thomas Eliot paraphrased a draft version of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause to mean “the power to prohibit State
legislation discriminating against classes of citizens.”144 Eliot’s usage,
however, is consistent with both the nondiscrimination and the fundamental
rights readings of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Again, under the
fundamental rights reading, a state may abridge privileges or immunities
not only by restricting the property and trade rights of virtually all
citizens, as happened in the Slaughter-House Cases, but also by securing
and ordering those rights for one race or class of citizens and denying
them to others. Thus, when Reconstruction era speakers used abridgment
interchangeably with race discrimination or class discrimination, their
usages do not necessarily support the nondiscrimination reading. To
provide that support, the usages would need to confirm that the speaker
used abridgment specifically to bar state race or class discrimination
without barring generally interventionist state property or contract
regulation.
C. Entitled and the Comity Clause
One final piece of textual evidence comes from the Constitution of
1787, specifically the Comity Clause. The diligent originalist must be

142. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
143. See CURRIE, supra note 14, at 346 & n.126; Harrison, supra note 15, at 1423–
24.
144. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866) (statement of Rep. Eliot),
quoted in Harrison, supra note 15, at 1423.
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careful here, and discount for the possibility that privileges and
immunities changed as constitutional terms of art from 1787 to 1868.
Even so, it is at least worth considering whether the terms privileges and
immunities are structurally consistent with the Comity Clause and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. If the originalist is focusing on original
public meaning, structural continuity provides some evidence, if weak,
to prefer the fundamental rights interpretation over the nondiscrimination
interpretation.
The key conceptual insight comes from the text of the Comity Clause:
“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”145 The verb in this Clause
is entitled. Entitled does no work to determine what particular rights are
enjoyed by the citizens covered. All the verb does is declare that
citizens covered have whatever rights that come within the ambits of
privileges or immunities. For the Comity Clause to have coherent
meaning, the terms privileges and immunities must have enough internal
content to say what is covered in a right and when a state action respects
or infringes the right. In other words, privileges and immunities must
presuppose a substantive theory of rights, which in turn delineates a
substantive theory of government regulation. The nondiscrimination
reading cannot satisfy these demands—at least, not without relying
through the backdoor on a substantive theory of rights and regulation.
But a substantive theory of constitutional privileges and immunities is
basically a fundamental rights theory of the same.
The simplest example is Corfield, which, again, held that the right to
fish for oysters in New Jersey territorial waters did not count as a
privilege or immunity under the Comity Clause.146 Under a fundamental
rights reading, this view is correct. Fundamental property and trade
rights refer to the positive laws that secure to individuals their natural
rights to be let alone, to determine the ends to which they may apply
their property and commercial liberty.147 A state does not need to extend
to out-of-state citizens usufructuary rights to extract common state
resources in order to protect their rights to enjoy their economic liberties
without interference.148 So the fundamental rights reading cleanly
separates the Comity Clause from state decisions to provide special

145. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
146. 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
147. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
148. See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552 (“[W]e cannot accede to the proposition . . . that
in regulating the use of the common property of the citizens of such state, the legislature
is bound to extend to the citizens of all the other states the same advantages as are
secured to their own citizens.”).
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benefits or subsidies to its citizens.149 It does so because the fundamental
rights content of privileges and immunities excludes government benefits or
subsidies. The verb entitled never comes into play.
The nondiscrimination view asks first whether Corfield is claiming a
fundamental right, and if so, it then asks whether New Jersey is
providing access to that right to out-of-state citizens on justifiably equal
terms as to in-state citizens. At first blush, this approach seems to
generate the same result as the fundamental rights approach—oyster
fishing is not a fundamental right. On closer inspection, however, the
inquiry is much more complicated. David Currie asserts that Corfield
excludes rights claims from the Comity Clause “unless the right was
fundamental,”150 but he does not explain how a judge is supposed to
determine whether a right is fundamental. If a right is fundamental
because it is fundamental in commonly shared principles of natural law
and rights articulated in the Declaration of Independence and elsewhere,
then Currie’s reading endorses the fundamental rights approach—except
through the backdoor, and only selectively, in a context where fundamental
rights analysis limits and does not enlarge judicial discretion.
Alternatively, fundamental rights analysis might not appeal to natural
law and rights principles directly. John Harrison sketches this possibility.
Again, he suggests that security, contractual capacity, and property are
subjects of fundamental rights.151 Yet Harrison does not explain why
these are the topics of fundamental rights. Nor does he explain why
private law property rights are fundamental while public law entitlements to
state property are not fundamental. For example, Harrison asserts that
the rights claimed in Corfield related not to “some well-known fundamental
right, but oysters.”152 He does not substantiate this assertion. A usufructuary
interest in harvesting oysters certainly sounds like a property right, and
therefore part of the “full specification of state law on basic subjects”
covering “property.”153 Perhaps New Jersey common law builds in
some “minimum theory of Lockean freedoms”154 to draw the line
149. However, this is only true as long as the benefits or subsidies do not restrain
out-of-state citizens’ rights to be let alone.
150. CURRIE, supra note 14, at 347 n.131; see also Harrison, supra note 15, at 1399
(reading Corfield to “involve[] not some well-known fundamental right” but merely
“oysters”).
151. Harrison, supra note 15, at 1422.
152. Id. at 1399.
153. Id. at 1418, 1422.
154. Id. at 1418.
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between private property rights on one hand and state open-access or
commons regimes on the other, and perhaps usufructuary rights to harvest
oysters in public waters fall on the latter side of the line. If the
nondiscrimination interpretation makes that move, however, it is
parasitic on the fundamental rights principles latent in New Jersey
common law.
If, however, the nondiscrimination interpretation does not appeal to
background substantive property theory, then it is not clear how one
distinguishes fundamental rights from state benefits. At that point, outof-state citizens may plausibly claim they are “entitled” to whatever
positive law benefits states confer on their own citizens. No surprise
that, more than a century later, after background Lockean principles
ceased to influence the law, the U.S. Supreme Court declared invalid a
state shrimping statute similar to the oyster law challenged in Corfield.155
Similarly, and more recently, Saenz v. Roe involved a challenge by an
out-of-state citizen to a durational residency requirement stopping her
from claiming California welfare benefits.156 The case was litigated with
a right-to-travel theory under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but an
originalist would probably find it more logical to situate the
challenge under the Comity Clause.157 If the Comity Clause enforces
a nondiscrimination principle without reference to any substantive
content, no substantive principle stops the welfare benefits from counting as
privileges and immunities as long as the court determines that welfare is
important enough to count as a fundamental right. That result, and Toomer’s
conflict with Corfield, seem fairly inconsistent with the Constitution’s
federal structure.158 If, however, Anglo-American traditions and histories
suggest that charitable entitlements are public benefits and not private
rights, the nondiscrimination approach gets whatever determinacy it has
by borrowing on moral principles latent in the authorities that determine
which rights are fundamental and which are not.159
155. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). The statute in Toomer allowed
selected out-of-state fishermen to shrimp, on condition that they pay a license fee one
hundred times greater than the fee for South Carolina fishermen and unload their cargo
in South Carolina. See id. at 390–91 & n.11.
156. 569 U.S. 489, 489–90 (1999).
157. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.; Id.
158. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181 (1868) (saying, of a claim by a
corporation to the benefits another state provides to in-state corporations, that “[i]f [the
Comity Clause] could be construed to secure to citizens of each State in other States the
peculiar privileges conferred by their laws, an extra-territorial operation would be given
to local legislation utterly destructive of the independence and the harmony of the
States.”).
159. This issue is also relevant to whether originalists can transplant a very
important noneconomic right from the Equal Protection Clause to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause—the right to a public education declared in Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
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VI. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF PRIVILEGES
OR IMMUNITIES
The interpretations suggested in the previous Part are exploratory and
suggestive, and they may be criticized in many ways. There are at least
two significant general criticisms. The interpretations focus fairly
closely on the literal meaning of privileges, immunities, and abridgments
as terms of art. As Part I acknowledged, however, originalists may
prefer to interpret legal text in light of original understandings or intentions.
Separately, the previous Part’s interpretation proceeds top-down.160 It
assumes that Blackstone’s usages of privileges, immunities, and abridgment
are more or less accurate, it identifies important corroborating examples,
and it interprets the text of the Fourteenth Amendment accordingly. In
his contribution to this Symposium, however, Michael Rappaport issues
a much-needed friendly warning to this approach: “The real world at any
time is a messier place. While [the Founders and Reconstructionists]
may have praised Locke, [they] also lived with various property regulations
that were inconsistent with Lockean thought.”161 Top-down methodology
needs to be challenged by bottom-up verification.
To illustrate, the interpretation presented in the previous Part conflicts
to a significant extent with how the terms privileges and immunities
were understood in some lines of antebellum Comity Clause case law.
The most revealing case is the 1812 New York decision Livingston v.
Van Ingen.162 New York granted Livingston, a New York resident, an
exclusive monopoly to operate a steamboat on a New York river for a
limited term. Livingston sued Van Ingen and other out-of-state citizens
347 U.S. 483 (1954). The universal right to a public education is a positive entitlement
from the state, not a negative liberty. If the fundamental rights covered by privileges and
immunities have no necessary connection to negative rights of life, liberty, or property,
and refer to any positive law rights that the local community considers important, it is
more likely that this right counts as a constitutional privilege or immunity. See Steven
G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When the
Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in
American History and Tradition?, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1114940; Harrison, supra note 15,
at 1462–63. If fundamental rights do require some direct connection to negative
Lockean liberties, this right is much less likely to count as a privilege or immunity.
160. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
161. Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the Fifth
Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth
Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 738 (2008).
162. 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812).
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for operating a competing steamboat in violation of his New York
charter. Under fundamental rights principles, New York could within its
police powers restrain free competition by granting a monopoly to
operate a steamboat exclusively for a limited term—if it could be shown
that the monopoly was necessary to encourage the growth of the
steamboat industry and that the monopoly was reasonably appropriate to
achieve that end. Similar principles informed state bridge-building163
and patent policy164 in the nineteenth century. If the steamboat industry
did require encouragement by a monopoly, then under the Comity
Clause, New York’s monopoly did not deny but rather enforced a substantive
proviso inherent in out-of-state citizens’ privileges and immunities under
the Clause. If not, then the monopoly did deny those citizens privileges
or immunities to which they were entitled by the Comity Clause.165
While that determination would have been empirical, it is at least
plausible to assume that the monopoly was not necessary to encourage
steamboating and that the New York law did violate the Comity Clause.
That result strains the federal structure. A New York citizen could not
challenge the steamboat monopoly under the pre-Civil War Constitution,
but the Comity Clause would give out-of-state citizens immunity from
the monopoly. Not every member of the New York Superior Court
discussed Van Ingen’s Comity Clause challenge in Livingston. But
Chancellor Kent did, and used the nondiscrimination interpretation to
foreclose this possibility: The Clause “means only that citizens of other
states shall have equal rights with our own citizens, and not that they
shall have different or greater rights.”166
Kent’s remarks provide some evidence that antebellum jurists
understood privileges and immunities in the Comity Clause to leave
states with wide latitude to specify the content of their property and
commercial laws however they chose, and that the Comity Clause only
required states to give out-of-state citizens access to the same protections
as their own citizens enjoyed. Scholars have debated how well the
nondiscrimination and fundamental rights views were represented in
antebellum Comity Clause case law.167 The nondiscrimination view was
163. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Peters) 420
(1837).
164. See Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought about
Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
953, 981–83 (2007).
165. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
166. Livingston, 9 Johns. at 577.
167. For three differing accounts, consider MALTZ, supra note 17, at 28–39 (finding
the nondiscrimination approach to prevail early in the nineteenth century and the
fundamental rights approach to become more popular as the slavery issue became more
contentious mid-century); Harrison, supra note 15, at 1416–20 (nondiscrimination view
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well represented,168 but it is hard to determine precisely whether it or the
fundamental rights approach prevailed. Except in cases like Livingston,
differences between the two interpretations were “of little practical
import” until the dispute over slavery erupted later.169
Even so, at a minimum, the nondiscrimination Comity Clause case
law creates some evidence that constitutional privileges and immunities
were not always understood by lawyers to follow Blackstonian fundamental
rights principles wherever they led in constitutional law. This evidence
could inform a textual analysis of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Perhaps, when lawyers used privileges and immunities as terms of
constitutional art, they ignored Blackstone’s suggestions about natural
law and understood privileges and immunities to refer to state positive
law as it was. Alternatively—and in my opinion, more probably—this
information could inform an original understanding interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Even if likely literal dictionary meanings
of privileges or immunities incorporated Blackstonian principles of
fundamental rights, perhaps most lawyers and politicians as of 1866
would have revolted at following that literal meaning out of a concern
for states’ rights.
Although this essay cannot settle such issues, it can make a few
general observations and highlight follow-up work that needs to be
pursued. First, at a minimum, this essay shows that the positivist
tendencies in nondiscrimination Comity Clause case law were not the
only factor at work in antebellum, Civil War, and Reconstruction era
understandings of privileges, immunities, and abridgments. A wide
cross-section of otherwise disparate legal and political actors presumed
that, when used in association with citizenship, privileges and immunities
tracked Blackstonian theory about how the social compact required
government to structure civil laws to secure basic natural rights.
That first insight leads to a second: It is possible that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s terms were reasonably read by the reasonable intended
audience—or were generally understood according to the dominant
understanding as of ratification—to codify the substantive natural rights
tendencies of privileges and immunities more than earlier nondiscrimination
dominates); David R. Upham, Note, Corfield v. Coryell and the Privileges and
Immunities of American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1498–1510 (2005) (finding
three different lines of Comity Clause cases, with the fundamental rights line prevailing).
168. See, e.g., KENT, supra note 37, at 71.
169. MALTZ, supra note 17, at 34.
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Comity Clause case law had. The materials interpreted in this essay
reinforce an insight of Earl Maltz about the selective use of Comity
Clause case law during and after the Civil War. When Livingston was
decided in 1812,
the idea of a state government failing to provide its own citizens generally with
the rights discussed in Corfield was almost unthinkable. . . . By contrast, in the
struggle over the status of slavery and the rights of free blacks, the choice
between Comity Clause theories at times became critical.170

On one hand, Livingston gets some priority over Corfield because it was
decided a decade closer to the ratification of the Constitution than
Corfield was. But for the purposes of understanding the Fourteenth
Amendment, Corfield might ultimately get higher priority. Corfield speaks
of privileges and immunities of citizenship with explicit reference to the
same higher law rights that informed the Declaration of Independence
and inspired the struggle against slavery. Once the slavery issue became
important, those references might have mattered more to jurists and
statesmen involved with the slavery struggle. It is revealing that
legislators like Senators Trumbull and Howard referred to Corfield and
not Livingston as the best understanding of privileges and immunities of
citizenship.171
Finally, and most important, the discussion presented here underscores
that antebellum Comity Clause case law is not the only evidence of
particular legal or political practices relevant to the original meaning or
understanding of privileges and immunities as terms of art in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Blackstone’s treatment of privileges, immunities,
and abridgment has sweeping implications. Blackstone uses privileges
and immunities, after all, as a metaphor for the civil rights individuals
should enjoy in a society with a free and republican government.
Blackstone could speak of the legal rights of the unborn, the affirmative
defenses against homicide, prohibitions against torture, habeas corpus,
or eminent domain as specific examples of privileges or immunities
securing absolute moral rights.172 Each of these examples, however, was
just an example. As terms of art for the social compact, privileges and
immunities include any civil laws instituted to secure and specify the
natural rights of life, liberty, or property, consistent with AngloAmerican practice, for the peculiar benefit of a free and republican
citizenry informed by Anglo-American law, religion, and tradition. To
nail down the meaning of privileges and immunities as used in the
170. Id.
171. See supra notes 79 and 96 and accompanying text.
172. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *126 (unborn), *126–27 (homicide),
*129–30 (torture), *130–32 (habeas corpus), *14–35 (eminent domain).
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Fourteenth Amendment, one would need to survey how the terms were
used in all contexts in which Blackstone’s usage makes them relevant.
For example, one might reasonably be skeptical that nineteenthcentury patent policy has anything to say about privileges and immunities as
constitutional terms of art. Not necessarily. Patents were called privileges
in the nineteenth century. Most contemporary patent scholars jump to the
anachronistic conclusion that patents were therefore regarded as
“governmentally conferred rights” assigned to inventors “as the beneficiaries
of a government license and [only] as . . . sufficient to encourage
innovation.”173 That conventional wisdom notwithstanding, patents fit
Blackstone’s conception of property privileges perfectly. While “[t]he
original of private property is probably founded in nature,” Blackstone
suggested, “the modifications under which we at present find it . . . are
entirely derived from society.”174 A patent is a civil law securing to and
specifying for an inventor his absolute right of property. It defines the
legal metes and bounds around the invention and the term of years in
which the owner may extract his natural right, a reasonable compensation
for the fruits of his labor. In other words, a patent is therefore a
Blackstonian privilege. As Adam Mossoff has shown, when nineteenthcentury American jurists referred to patents as privileges, they followed
this sense—and the natural rights principles inherent in privilege gave
patent doctrine substantive content that followed from Lockean and
Blackstonian principles of productive labor.175 Mossoff’s findings
confirm that Corfield’s treatment of privileges and immunities accord
with one important area of economic regulation more than Livingston’s.
If enough other areas of law provide similar confirmation, the confirmation
would provide strong evidence explaining why Reconstruction era
legislators regarded Corfield as a more accurate exposition of privileges
and immunities than Livingston. Of course, that is a huge undertaking.
State constitutions and property and commercial regulations might refer
to property or commercial rights as privileges or immunities in ways as
revealing as patent law. Since privileges and immunities refer to rights
essential to citizenship, state and federal immigration and naturalization

173. Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules
Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 783 (2007).
174. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *134.
175. See Mossoff, supra note 164, at 990–92.
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laws may shed relevant light.176 For the same reason, United States
treaties might also be relevant, if they promised that the United States
would give the subjects of foreign governments the same protections as
the privileges or immunities to which U.S. citizens were entitled.177 It is
no answer to say that some lines of Comity Clause case law deserve
pride of place over other evidence because the Comity Clause is a
constitutional doctrine. Each of these sources needs to be considered not
based on its hierarchical status but by the extent to which it sheds
meaningful light on the meaning of—or understanding behind—privileges,
immunities, citizens, and abridging as terms of art in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Of course, these inquiries are simply suggestive. For example, assume
it could be shown that the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment chose the terms privileges and immunities to pick up the
terms’ higher law associations from Blackstone and Corfield. In an
original-understanding analysis, that showing might prove that the
drafters and ratifiers understood the Fourteenth Amendment to disrupt
federalism only as necessary to rectify black-white race relations in the
Reconstruction South. In other words, even though the Privileges or
Immunities Clause codified higher law principles, perhaps it was generally
understood that such principles would not be used to give federal legislators
and courts the power to negate state zoning laws, licensing schemes, and
other nondiscriminatory property or commercial regulations that interfere
with classical liberal government theory. This and many other objections
would need to be considered. My point here is simply that scholarship
has only begun to scratch the surface of a complicated historical
reclamation project.
VII. CONCLUSION
Blackstone’s Commentaries portray privileges and immunities associated
with free government in a focused manner. In Blackstone’s portrait,
privileges and immunities refer to civil laws, securing absolute natural
rights of life, liberty, and property, to the individuals who consent to join
a free political community. Important public documents, treatises, and
statements, from the United States’ colonial period, founding, and
Reconstruction periods, all assume an understanding substantially similar to
Blackstone’s, as adapted to the context of a country organized explicitly

176. See generally ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997) (examining the evolution of rights in America as a
result of political, legal, and historical change).
177. See AMAR, supra note 19, at 167–69.
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around the republican principles articulated in the Declaration of
Independence.
With qualifications, Blackstone’s portrait provides some additional
evidence that Professor Siegan was on the right track in his scholarship
on the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Among other reasons, Blackstone’s
portrait makes extremely explicit the connection between privileges,
immunities, and absolute and fundamental natural rights. Blackstone
provides historical and theoretical context in which Corfield v. Coryell
makes far more sense as the leading American constitutional pronouncement
on privileges and immunities. Blackstone also provides important confirming
evidence that abridging, as used in the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
accords more with the fundamental rights reading than with alternative
interpretations.
Of course, Blackstone’s Commentaries are hardly dispositive by
themselves. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified eighty years after
the Commentaries—in a different country, in different historical circumstances,
after a lot of messy and inconsistent practices corroborating or
undercutting Blackstone’s portrait. At the same time, Blackstone’s
Commentaries provide a clear window on how pre-Civil War American
statesmen and lawyers understood privileges and immunities as terms of
law and political theory. That window should in turn help originalists
determine more precisely how privileges and immunities were understood
in context as terms of art for the civil rights citizens were entitled to
enjoy in a republican political community.
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